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I. ALL ABOARD
The Short Bus' is an appropriate metaphor for the place that students with
disabilities have occupied, and continue to occupy, in many of the nation's
schools. After more than three decades of litigation, legislation, and changes in
educational policy and pedagogy, disabled 2 pupils have moved closer to taking
Staff Attorney, Disability Rights California (DRC); Lecturer, Stanford
Law
School and University of California, Berkeley School of Law; Visiting
Scholar, University of Auckland, New Zealand, School of Critical Studies
in Education (2008). The views here are those of the author and not necessarily those of
DRC or its board of directors or staff. I thank Journal editors Eunice Hyunhye Cho, Linda
Eva Rangel, and Brian Bilford for their comments on earlier drafts.
1. See, e.g., Wikipedia.org, Short Bus, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Short_bus (last
visited May 14, 2007) (describing buses used to transport small numbers of schoolchildren
such as those in a special education class or segregated school). "[Taking the short bus" has
become a pejorative term "used to imply that the subject is mentally challenged (or simply
stupid)." Id.
2. Some colleagues shudder when I use "disability first" language. See Stephen A.
Rosenbaum, Aligning or Maligning? Getting Inside a New IDEA: Getting Behind No Child
Left Behind and Getting Outside of It All, 15 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 4 n.14 (2004).
*
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seats next to their non-disabled peers-on the bus and in the classroom.3 Yet,
the goal of having all children ride the big or "regular" bus is still elusive.
Since the inception of civil rights lawsuits for disabled children 4 and the
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 5 there have been two
recent developments that may affect not simply where those students sit, but
how they are viewed by their teachers, administrators and peers in the larger
school context.
First, some commentators and policymakers have suggested that the
schoolhouse "door to special education services has opened too widely and too
indiscriminately. . . ." Professor Wendy Hensel alludes to "The Short Bus" in
her article responding to the recent calls to shrink the student eligibility
While advocates "have all but abandoned the antiquated label 'handicapped'. . . the verdict is
not yet in whether 'disabled person' is acceptable in lieu of a 'people first' term like 'person
with a disability."' Id. (citations omitted). Curiously, the disability cognoscenti are as likely
to refer to handicappedparking as women steeped in feminist lexicon insist on using the
ladies'room.For others, the name game is all about internal intellectualizing. See, e.g., Why
"Voice
of
the
Retarded? "
A
Statement
About
Our
Name,
http://www.vor.net/namegame.htm (last visited May 5, 2007) (reporting that parental
advocacy organization claims "[t]he buzz" about appropriate nomenclature "relates mostly to
the debate within disability circles").
3. One indicator of society's failure to embrace the student with intellectual disabilities
is the list of more vulgar names for the short bus contained in the Wikipedia entry for Short
Bus, which includes "retard cart," "syndrome truck," "window licker," "sped sled," "spedex," and "retard rocket." Wikipedia.org, Short Bus, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Short_bus
(last visited Dec. 17, 2007).
4. See generally Pa. Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 334 F. Supp. 1257
(D.Pa. 1971) and Mills v. Bd. of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866 (D. D.C. 1972) (standing, among
the earliest cases, for the principle that children with disabilities have a civil right to receive
an education).
5. The original act was adopted in 1975 as the Education for All Handicapped Children
Act, Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773, and has been amended and renamed several times
since. Congress reauthorized the Act in 2004 after more than two years of debate. Pub. L.
No. 108-446, 118 Stat. 2647. The reauthorization was intended to align the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act with across-the-board educational standards and accountability
measures for all students enunciated in the No Child Left Behind (NCLB) Act. See
Rosenbaum, supra note 2, at 4-5, 26-30; Mark C. Weber, Reflections on the New Individuals
with DisabilitiesEducation Improvement Act, 58 FLA. L. REv. 7, 16-22 (2006). In its current
iteration, the statute is officially dubbed the Individuals with Disabilities Education
Improvement Act (IDEIA), a title deemed "Orwellian" by one veteran commentator. (It may
still be properly referred to as the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). 20
U.S.C. § 1400(a) (2006)).
6. Wendy F. Hensel, Sharing the Short Bus: Eligibility and Identity Under the IDEA,
58 HASTINGS L.J. 1147, 1149 (2007) (citing Wade F. Horn & Douglas Tynan, Time to Make
Education "Special" Again, in RETHINKING SPECIAL EDUCATION FOR ANEW CENTURY 23, 26
(Chester E. Finn, Jr. et al., eds., 2001)) [hereinafter RETHINKING SPECIAL EDUCATION];

Gregory F. Corbett, Special Education, Equal Protection and Education Finance: Does the
Individuals with DisabilitiesAct Violate a General Education Student's FundamentalRight
to Education?, 40 B.C. L. REv. 633, 634 (1999). For a more extensive discussion of the
critique, see Terry Jean Seligmann, An IDEA Schools Can Use: Lessons from Special
Education Legislation, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 759, 768-69 nn.62-65 and accompanying text
(2001).

Oct. 2008]

FULL SP[]EDAHEAD

definition under IDEA. 7 "Many in society have a clear image of the children
they believe belong on the bus and those that do not." 8 The shrinkage of the
class of eligible students of course leads to a reduction in educational
expenditures.
Second, the No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB), 9 which is now firmly
implanted in virtually all of the nation's public schools, is the most significant
federal education policy reform in place for students in the so-called general
education curriculum. The Act dictates a level of academic progress, and
instructional interventions, meant to assist all pupils, including those with
disabilities along with other marginalized students.I
In this Essay, I call for an end to the line-drawing and hoop-jumping. Like
Professor Hensel, I believe the public policy focus should not be on the breadth
or narrowness of the definition of disability under IDEA."l I also share her
belief that educators and policymakers must continue to grapple with the extent

7. Hensel, supra note 6. 1 first began to think about this question as a respondent to
Professor Hensel's paper, presented at the Hastings College of the Law National Disability
Law Symposium (Feb. 3, 2007). I had not previously heard of the "Short Bus." Rather, the
image lodged in my head was of the equally stigmatizing "Little Yellow Bus," which my son
has ridden for most of his 17 years in "special ed" or "sped." Apparently, I am not alone in
associating the Yellow Bus with special education, although this term is more equivocal than
the "Short Bus." See, e.g., Quinton Hatfield, All Aboard The Yellow Bus: Mistah F.A.B,
http://www.hhnlive.com/features/more/173 (last visited Feb. 24, 2008) (describing his hiphop album Yellow Bus Rydah as follows: "[W]hen you see the yellow school bus you think
'Aw, look at the slow kids cracking jokes having something funny to say.' If you ever were
friends with anybody on that bus you realize they was just slow, you realize they just had a
mental problem that keep them from not being as fast as everyone else on a conversational
level. If you dug deep into their minds you realize they were highly intelligent. They had
great artistic abilities within their differences.").
8. Hensel, supra note 6, at 1151 n.22. A decade earlier, Professors Mark Kelman and
Gillian Lester wrote at length about the same phenomenon, in slightly different terms: "[A]s
a society, we must make decisions about which students deserve resources beyond those
devoted to their classmates." MARK KELMAN & GILLIAN LESTER, JUMPING THE QUEUE: AN
INQUIRY INTO THE LEGAL TREATMENT OF STUDENTS WITH LEARNING DISABILITIES 6 (1997).
9. Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-10, 79 Stat. 27,
20 U.S.C. §§ 6301-6339 (2006). Members of Congress and the Administration have put
forth proposals for reauthorization of NCLB. See, e.g., No Child Left Behind Reform Act, S.
1194, 110th Cong. (2007), H.R. 2087, 110th Cong. (2007); Sec'y Margaret Spellings,
Building on Results: A Blueprintfor Strengthening the No Child Left Behind Act (U.S. Dept.
of Educ., Jessup, MD), Jan. 2007, available at http://www.ed.gov/policy/elsec/leg/nclb/
buildingonresults.html.
10. Note that the IDEA exempts from the definition of disability those learning
problems that are due to "environmental, cultural, or economic disadvantage" or social
maladjustment in the absence of emotional disturbance. 34 C.F.R. § 300.8(C)(4)-(10)(ii)
(2007).
11. Hensel, supra note 6, at 1152. Before the 2004 amendments were enacted,
Professor Terry Jean Seligmann had also concluded the definition should not be narrowed.
Seligmann, supra note 6, at 767.
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of services, if for no other reason than the spiraling cost. 12 However, in moving
toward an educational system that is more inclusive in implementing the "least
restrictive environment" principle under the IDEA-and the success-for-all
mandate ofNCLB 13-I believe we need to refine the laws and policies that end
the divide between disabled students and their nondisabled peers who also
require intensive academic or other educational supports.
We must therefore evaluate the remedial needs of a broader group of
students-those situated outside the traditional and legal disability circle-and
craft individualized programs for them as well, whether or not they are deemed
IDEA-eligible. Moreover, we should strengthen another important factor that is
key to the success of students with disabilities: adequate preparation of teachers
and other professional staff to meet the needs of all students. Finally, the
monitoring of children's programs and progress that is now available to parents
of disabled youngsters should be extended to parents of other students in
need. 14 In making a shift in legal and pedagogical analysis, it is important that
we not attach political or ideological labels to a change in conceptualization. 15

12. See also Corbett, supra note 6, at 649 ("[I]ncreases in special education costs are
effectively siphoned from general education spending because local school districts across
the country have fixed budgets."). Those of us in the disability advocacy community bristle
at the term "encroachment," used by administrators who claim that expenditures for special
education students are cutting into the general fund. Audio tape: Symposium on Education as
a Civil Right, held by the Stanford Journal of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties (Feb. 2, 2008)
(on file with author). While we routinely respond that disabled students are also part of the
general student body, we cannot ignore the fact that some needs are indeed costly.
13. There are two known pronunciations of the NCLB acronym: "N-C-L-B" is the
standard one. I was unaware of another until Dean Christopher Edley injected the more
lyrical "NIK-el-bee" into his Symposium keynote address. Christopher Edley, Dean, Univ.
of Berkeley Law Sch., Keynote Address at the Stanford Journal of Civil Rights and Civil
Liberties Symposium: Education as a Civil Right (Feb. 2, 2008).
14. My views are informed by my own professional and personal experience. I have
practiced for almost a decade as a lawyer with Disability Rights California (formerly,
Protection & Advocacy, Inc.), an affiliate of the federal network of non-profit "protection
and advocacy" organizations representing people with disabilities to advance their service,
legal and human rights, and before that as the Disability Rights Education and Defense
Fund's senior litigation attorney. I am also the father of David Rafael, a young man with
significant intellectual and physical disabilities. For an account of my experiences in
advocating for my son's educational, habilitative and service needs, see Stephen A.
Rosenbaum, When It's Not Apparent: Some Modest Advice to ParentAdvocates for Students
with Disabilities, 5 U.C. DAVIS J. Juv. L. & POL'Y 159 (2001) and Stephen A. Rosenbaum,
Representing David: When Best Practices Aren't and Natural Supports Really Are, 11 U.C.
DAVIS J. Juv. L. & POL'Y 161 (2007) [hereinafter Representing David].
15. I reject what Professors Kelman and Lester characterize as a "left multiculturalist"
view in which learning-disabled students are viewed as a "readily identifiable subset of
pupils" more worthy of assistance and resources than a broader group of unidentified "poor
learners." KELMAN & LESTER, supra note 8, at 197. This political label is as much a
distortion as the characterization itself It would be equally unhelpful to brand the call for the
elimination of disability-based determinations as right-wing or reactionary.
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II.

CHANGING DEFINITION

Professor Hensel reminds us that resource allocation is a topic that is alive
and well in the realm of limited education funding. Some commentators fear
that relaxed IDEA eligibility guidelines will allow general education to
swallow up special education, with the disabled children Congress intended to
serve left unserved. 16 Other commentators argue that eligibility must be
restricted to prevent special education from draining the resources available to
the regular education students. Professor Mark Kelman, for instance, poses an
uncomfortable question for special education advocates about costs: are there
children who might deserve incremental school resources as much or more than
special education students, for example, children with low IQs but ineligible for
IDEA, children of color, children with harsh conditions at home? 17 Hensel
thoroughly explores the legal and social implications of the rising number of
this subclass of "less disabled" special education students. She concludes that
the growth is positive and consistent with Congress' intent "to bring all
students, regardless of functioning, into the mainstream of American
education."' 18 The debate, she urges, should not be about the severity of these
youngsters' disability, but about the extent of services that should be made
available to pupils with disabilities.
The shrinking definition of disability espoused by scholars and policy
analysts is also evident in recent IDEA jurisprudence. Just as the courts have
whittled away at the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), judges are
restricting the definition of disability under the IDEA as well as parents' ability
to advocate for their children in administrative and judicial proceedings. A
number of decisions have adopted a mitigation analysis, akin to the Supreme
Court's approach in analyzing the ADA in the so-called Sutton trilogy of
cases. 19 That is, if a child performs adequately with mitigation, such as

16. See Hensel, supra note 6, at 1150 n. 18 (quoting 2003 congressional findings on the

over-identification of children as disabled, depriving the "truly ... disabled" of "valuable
resources"). Other commentators concur. Id. (citing backlash against "false identification" of
special needs children as well as argument to reclaim special education for "the genuinely
disabled" (citations omitted)).
17. Mark Kelman, The Moral Foundationsof Special Education Law, in RETHINKING

supra note 8, at 78; see also Seligmann, supra
note 6, at 761 (criticizing funding "tug of war between 'regular' and 'special education'
kids"); Hensel, supra note 6, at 1188 (questioning the "implicit assumption that typical
children are presumptively entitled to all educational funding").
18. Hensel, supranote 6, at 1152.
SPECIAL EDUCATION FOR A NEW CENTURY,

19. See Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002); Murphy v. United
Parcel Serv. 527 U.S. 516 (1999); Sutton v. United Airlines, 527 U.S. 471 (1999). In this

series of employment cases, the Court held that all mitigating measures utilized by employee
plaintiffs must be taken into account in determining whether a plaintiff actually has a
disability within the meaning of the ADA. See Hensel, supra note 6, at 1182 n.205. More
than one commentator has lamented the gutting of statutory protections as a result of these
holdings. Id. at 1182 nn.202-03.
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classroom "supports and services," she cannot establish an "adverse effect" on
educational performance and is therefore ineligible for special education. 20
Other recent setbacks for parents include decisions by the Court placing the
burden of proof on parents who petition for due process hearings 2 1 and
disallowing the recovery of expert witness fees. 22 Decisions adverse to students
and parents have also come from the federal appellate courts. 23 As disability is
redefined and parental advocacy is constrained, 24 one may well wonder if our
schools will continue their obligation to properly identify children with
disabling conditions and undertake appropriate instructional measures.
Unlike the ADA, the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act is not,
strictly speaking, a civil rights statute: 25 it does not primarily address
discrimination, but rather, educational deficits. 26 The IDEA is defined by
remediation, intervention, support, services, and specialized instruction-what

20. See, e.g., R.B. ex rel. F.B. v. Napa Valley Unified Sch. Dist., 496 F.3d 932, 946
(9th Cir. 2007); Ashli C. ex rel. Sidney C. v. Hawaii, No. 05-00429, 2007 WL 247761, at *9
(D. Haw. Jan. 23, 2007); Hensel, supra note 6, at 1170-73.
21. Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49 (2005).
22. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291 (2006). Legislation has been
introduced in the House of Representatives to reverse the holding of Murphy. See IDEA
Fairness Restoration Act, H.R. 4188, 110th Cong. (1st Sess. 2007).
23. See e.g., Van Duyn v. Baker Sch. Dist. 5J, 481 F.3d 770 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding
that only "material" failure to implement IEP [individualized education program] may result
in district's denying a free appropriate public education); A.B. v. Lawson, 354 F.3d 315, 325
(4th Cir. 2004) (finding that lower court incorrectly substituted own views for
determinations of local education officials who offered student an IEP "reasonably
calculated to provide him some educational benefit, thus . . . satisfying IDEA's modest
requirements") (emphasis added); Beth B. v. Van Clay, 282 F.3d 493 (7th Cir. 2002)
(holding that educators' decision in placement trumps parents').
24. Not all the recent decisions from the high court have been hostile to parents. See,
e.g., Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist., 127 S. Ct. 1994 (2007) (holding that non-lawyer
parent's representation of child in court appeal permitted under IDEA and does not
constitute unauthorized practice of law); Bd. of Educ. v. Tom F., 128 S. Ct. 1 (2007)
(affirming judgment that parents are entitled to reimbursement of private school tuition
where school district failed to offer appropriate education, without first enrolling child in
district program).
25. For a summary of the provisions of the IDEA and ADA school requirements, see
Linda Headley & Stephen A. Rosenbaum, Schools and EducationalPrograms,in AIDS AND
THE LAW §5 (David W. Webber ed., 4th ed. 2007).
26. Notwithstanding this legal distinction, one national disability advocacy
organization called the IDEA "the most important [U.S.] civil rights law ever passed for
children with disabilities." Press Release, Disability Rights Education & Defense Fund, S.
1248: Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act of 2003: Many
Improvements but Ongoing Concerns (June 24, 2003), available at http://www.dredf.org/
pressreleases/Senate Markup.html) For comparisons of how disabled students are treated
under the IDEA, ADA and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, see Perry Zirkel, A
Comparison of the IDEA and Section 504/ADA, 178 WEST'S EDUC. LAW REP. 629 (2004);
Christopher J. Walker, Adequate Access or Equal Treatment: Looking Beyond IDEA and
Section 504 in a Post-Schaffer Public School, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1563, 1579-98 (2006); see
also infra notes 28 and 48.
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might facetiously be referred to as "unreasonable accommodations." 27 A
school district may not assert the undue burden or fiscal hardship defense that
is allowed in certain instances under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act 2 8 or
the ADA.29 Yet, a district's resistance to remediating or otherwise redressing
an IDEA student's disability is often all about money and resources. 30 While
the IDEA is one of the best educational initiatives ever hatched by Congress, a
catchy acronym and an improved and reborn statute 3 1 are not enough to make
up for the longstanding lack of congressional appropriations. 32
Professor Hensel posits that "bestowing unfunded mandates" on local
school authorities in the name of IDEA is less problematic than imposing
obligations on private entities and the more rigorous examination of what
constitutes "disability" under the ADA. But, she notes that "[a]s special
education enrollment rises and schools are required to comply with NCLB
without adequate funding,... the competition for scarce education dollars will
increase, and with it, scrutiny of the class receiving services under the
IDEA."' 33 I believe that that scenario is already in place.

27. The better expression would be accommodations or resources that "exceed
reasonable cost." See Michael Ashley Stein & Penelope J.S. Stein, Beyond Disability Civil
Rights, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 1203, 1224 (2007). The authors argue that paying these additional
costs could perhaps even "enable above-average function." Id. (emphasis added). But see
Nirmala Erevelles et al., How Does It Feel to Be a Problem? Race, Disability,and Exclusion
in Educational Policy, in WHO BENEFITS FROM SPECIAL EDUCATION? 89-90 (Ellen A.
Brantlinger ed., 2006) (criticizing deficit model of disability whereby student is perceived as
"having some inadequacy, shortcoming, failure or disease") (citation omitted).
28. See, e.g., 34 C.F.R. § 104.12 (2008) (exempting employer from making reasonable
accommodation where "undue hardship" is present under Section 504 employment
regulation). For non-employment purposes, Section 504 exemptions or "defenses" are
slightly different. For example, a school receiving federal funds shall place a disabled
student in the regular school setting "unless it is demonstrated ... that the education of the
person in the regular environment with the use of supplementary aids and services cannot be
achieved satisfactorily." 34 C.F.R. § 104.34(a) (2008).
29. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111(10), 12182(b)(2)(A) (2008) (including in statutory
defenses "undue hardship" or "fundamental alteration").
30. Rosenbaum, When It's Not Apparent, supra note 14, at 174 n.55 (noting that
program cost factor is like a big dollar sign hanging over a "tiny formica IEP table").
31. Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 108-446,
118 Stat. 2647 (2004).
32. See Hensel, supra note 6, at 1155 n.47 (noting that Congress has never fully funded
IDEA, falling far short of its goal to cover 40% of costs incurred by states); see also H.R.
REP. No. 108-77, at 125 (2003). For an explanation and history of the federal funding

formula,

see MARY KONYA WEISHAAR ET AL., INCLUSIVE EDUCATIONAL ADMINISTRATION

129-32 (2d ed. 2007).
33. Hensel, supra note 6, at 1185. I believe Professor Hensel's assertion is equally
inaccurate that the IDEA, like the ADA, requires parties "to actively engage in an interactive
process to determine how the [students] can best function in an environment tailored to meet
[their] needs .... " Hensel, supra note 6, at 1185. In point of fact, the active engagement is
often lacking, and school districts are the first to insist that "best" is not the standard they
need to meet under the federal special education statute.
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III. WHAT'S IN A NAME?
Are there more children claiming a disability who don't warrant the
eligibility label? 34 The media image is of white middle class parents urgently
seeking college admission for their sons and daughters who discover new
diagnoses as they face entrance exams. 3 5 But, there is another story.
Stigmatizing or not, today's parents of at-risk or low-achieving students
(including students of color) may actually want to get their youngsters qualified
for special education services, because it is perceived as the pathway to getting
resources and attention in overburdened, underfunded schools. 36 As Hensel
puts it, "perverse incentives" lead parents to emphasize the severity of a child's
impairment as "eligibility is all or nothing .......
37 This does not mean,
however, that parents necessarily want their child placed in a special day class
or other segregated setting. 38

34. See, e.g., Hom & Tynan, supra note 6, at 30; Corbett, supra note 6, at 64648; and
KELMAN & LESTER, supra note 8, at 80-85.
35. Hensel, supra note 6, at 1193 (describing "instances of alleged abuse by wealthy
parents noted in the popular press"); id. at 1166 (attributing IDEA's initial success to
"confluence of interests and advocacy between civil rights proponents and a group of largely
middle class white parents who desired to secure assistance for their children's academic
difficulties," but arguing that the learning disability label "quickly came under attack as a
'bogus' disability") (citations omitted).
36. A special education placement may be seen as the only alternative to school failure.
According to one study, some professionals have suggested "[n]o LD [Learning Disability],
no services." BETH HARRY & JANETTE KLINGNER, WHY ARE SO MANY MINORITY STUDENTS
IN SPECIAL EDUCATION? 14 (2006). See also Anna B. Duff, How Special Education Policy
Affects Districts, in RETHINKING SPECIAL EDUCATION, supra note 6, at 135, 139 (observing
that there is less stigma now in applying for special education eligibility and "this is the way
you get help"). Not all parents are eager to have their children wear the special education
label. See, e.g., Theresa Glennon, Race, Education and the Construction of a DisabledClass,
1995 Wis. L. REV. 1237, 1327 (1995) (noting that black parents are "far less likely than
school officials to identify children as having 'mild' disabilities") (citation omitted); see also
20 U.S.C. §§ 1400(c)(12), 1412(a)(24), 1418(d) (2008) (finding that minority youths,
particularly African Americans, have been disproportionately identified as special education
students, and that states must take steps to prevent "this historic trend"). For a disability
studies and critical race theory critique of minority over-representation, see Erevelles et al.,
supra note 27, at 77. The authors assert that school policies continue to be guided by the
notion that "Whiteness is equated with competence/ableism and Blackness with
incompetence/disability." Id. at 88. See also Lyndsay R. Carothers, Note, Here's an IDEA:
Providing Intervention Services for at-Risk Youth Under the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act, 42 VAL. U. L. REV. 543 (2007) (arguing for race-neutral evaluation criteria
and early interventions for at-risk children to reduce over-identification of minority pupils).
37. Hensel, supra note 6, at 1187. She also notes that the per pupil cost is 91% higher
for special education than regular education. Id. at 1149 n. 15.
38. Professors Kelman and Lester remind us that the early special education litigation
was motivated in part by a "desire to fight the exclusion of children of color from the
schools." KELMAN & LESTER, supra note 8, at 4. In the wake of Brown v. Board of
Education, civil rights activists were concerned about the disproportionate number of
nonwhite children labeled as mentally retarded and placed in segregated classrooms, or in
separate schools. Id. All of the student plaintiffs in Mills v. Board of Education, 348 F.Supp.
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IV. AMBIGUOUSLY APPROPRIATE

What exactly is special education? Hensel notes that the definition "is
relatively ambiguous and a subject of debate." 39 The statute and regulations
provide an equally unsatisfying definition: "[S]pecially designed instruction...
to meet the unique needs of a child with a disability . . .. "49The regulations in

turn define specially designed instruction as "adapting, as appropriate to the
needs of an eligible child . . . the content, methodology, or delivery of

instruction" to address the child's needs and to ensure access to the general
curriculum. 4 1 In keeping with the tautological nature of the definition, before
the term was defined in regulations, the Office of Special Education Programs
explained that "specially designed instruction" means
"education planned for a
' ' 42
particular individual or 'individualized instruction.
It is like saying the definition of special education is "special education"or more precisely "specialized education." If this definition is relatively
ambiguous, then what is ambiguous? On the other hand, the statute's wisdom
and beauty lay in its flexibility, subject to the particularities invested in it by
members of the individualized educational program (IEP) team.
A related quandary is presented by the definition of "appropriate," as in the
child's entitlement to a Free Appropriate Public Education or FAPE. FAPE is
defined as specialized instruction and "related services ' 43 that are offered at an
appropriate school, at public expense, and meet state educational agency
standards. This education must also be provided in conformity with an IEP and
all the procedural requirements concerning IEP content, team membership and
parent participation, as set out in the regulations. 44 The case law interpreting
"appropriate" is varied and voluminous. The landmark case of Board of
Education v. Rowley 4 5 set a very low bar, in which the test for "appropriate" is
in two parts: First, has the State complied with the procedural requirements set
866 (D. D.C. 1972), were African-American. Professors Harry and Klingner catalogue the
downside of the special education track for these students: large classes, teacher shortages,
undifferentiated instruction, poor teacher quality and stigma. HARRY & KLINGNER, supra
note 34, at 160.
39. Hensel, supra note 6, at 1174; see also id. at 1174-76 (discussing the definition of
special education).
40. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(29) (2006); 34 C.F.R. § 300.39(a)(1) (2006).
41. 34 C.F.R. § 300.39(b)(3) (2006).
42. Letter to Smith, 19 IDELR 494, 495 (OSEP [Office of Special Education
Programs] 1992).
43. Related services include a wide array of "supportive services" required to assist a
child "to benefit from special education," such as speech-language pathology, physical and
occupational therapy, counseling or social work services, medical diagnostic and school
nurse services, interpreting, recreation, orientation and mobility services, and parent
counseling and training. 34 C.F.R. §300.34(a) (2008).
44. 34 C.F.R. §300.320 et seq. (2008); see also 20 U.S.C. §1401(9) (2006); 34 C.F.R.
§300.17 (2008).
45. Board of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176 (1982).
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forth in the IDEA? Second, "is the [IEP] ... reasonably calculated to enable the
child to receive educational benefits?" 46 Since its issuance just over a quartercentury ago, Rowley has spawned a number of appellate and trial court
decisions. Still, as one commentator recently wrote: "As long as the Supreme
Court does not overrule Rowley or refine its interpretation in a subsequent
decision, the meaning of the term appropriate remains unclear, undefined,
inconsistently aplied, and a source of frustration in educational
implementation."
Moreover, as Hensel notes, the courts are not in agreement on what
services are included under the special education umbrella and there is little
48
guidance from the U.S. Department of Education.

46. Id. at 206-07. The high court has not revisited this definition since. See also Judith
DeBerry, When Parents and Special Educators Clash: Are Students Entitled to a Cadillac
Education?, 34 ST. MARY'S L.J. 503, 523-26 (2003) (analyzing the Rowley standard and
post-Rowley case law holding school districts accountable for a low level of "educational
benefit" in satisfying their obligation to deliver FAPE). For more recent case law and an
argument in favor of a clearer federal definition of "appropriate," particularly in light of
NCLB, see Andrea Blau, The IDEA And The Right To An "Appropriate"Education, 2007
BYU EDUC. & L.J. 1 (2007). The author is dubious that the Court will take up the definition
anew and also notes Congress' refusal to clarify the concept, as illustrated by its recent
enactment of the "improved" IDEA in 2004. See infra note 79 (describing recent
commentary and cases challenging Rowley standard). Of course, in real life, what every
parent wants is not what is "appropriate," but what is "best." At least one state comes close
to meeting that. Michigan requires districts to design an IEP to "develop the maximum
potential" of disabled students as a way "to enhance IDEA's requirements." Renner v. Bd. of
Educ. of Public Sch. of City of Ann Arbor, 185 F.3d 635, 645 (6th Cir. 1999). However, the
one appellate court to review the statute has determined that the term is undefined and the
standard "may be more precatory than mandatory; it does not necessarily require the best
education possible." Id.
47. Blau, supra note 46, at 14. Writing after the 1997 IDEA amendments were enacted,
two prominent school district attorneys described the Rowley standard as "cryptic and
intangible." Joyce 0. Eckrem & Eliza J. McArthur, Is the Rowley Standard Dead? From
Access to Results, 5 U.C. DAVIS J. Juv. L. & POL'Y 199, 217 (2001); see also infra note 79.
48. Hensel, supra note 6, at 1174-75. In comparison, the regulatory definition of
"appropriate" for students with disabilities who qualify for Section 504 plans is "regular or
special education and related aids and services" that are "designed to meet [the] individual
educational needs of handicapped persons as adequately as the needs of nonhandicapped
persons are met" and are presumptively provided in an integrated setting. 34 C.F.R. §
104.33(b) (2008). Youngsters schooled in accordance with a "504 plan" do not meet the
IDEA categorical disabilities criteria, but nonetheless have a substantially limiting physical
or mental impairment within the meaning of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.
In my experience, this residual definition of disability is often met by a residual or diluted
interpretation of educational interventions and standards on the part of school authorities.
This also means residual--or no-funding or procedural safeguards. Rehabilitation Act of
1973, 29 U.S.C. § 701 etseq. (1998).
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V. INCLUSIVE EDUCATION

The IDEA also establishes a presumption that children with disabilities are
to be included in the regular classroom environment, 49 although the term
"inclusive" -popularized by educators, 50 parents, and advocates '-is never
used in the statute or IDEA case law. 52 The reality of creating an inclusive
classroom is much harder than the theory. Too often, we see the practice of
"dump and pray." That is, dump the child in the regular classroom-without

49. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400(c)(5)(A) & (D), 1412(a)(5)(B) (2008); 34 C.F.R. §
300.114(a)(2) (2008). This presumption underscores the principle that special education is
about services and not classroom location. See RUTH COLKER, THE LAW OF DISABILITY
DISCRIMINATION 305-13 (6th ed. 2007) (brief historical overview of special education
statutory and case law); Michael A. Rebell & Robert L. Hughes, Special Educational
Inclusion and the Courts: A Proposalfor a New Remedial Approach, 25 J.L. & EDUC. 523,
548-65 (1996) (noting that a "least restrictive environment" or LRE owes its place as a key
IDEA component in reaction to a history of "the stigmatizing effect of differential special
placements," the aftermath of Brown v. Board of Education, educational theories stressing
integration, and LRE's consistency with individualizing a child's placement); Mark C.
Weber, The Least Restrictive Environment Obligation as an Entitlement to Educational
Services: A Commentary, 5 U.C. DAVIS J. Juv. L. & POL'Y 147 (2001) (reviewing the
tensions between FAPE and LRE).

50. I thank Professor Pam Hunt, San Francisco State University, College of Education,
for introducing me to the more nuanced term "inclusive education," which appears to be a
recognition that "full inclusion" is not necessarily the least restrictive or ideal setting for
every disabled student. The "full inclusion" movement, which originated as the Regular
Education Initiative (REI), was intended to "break[] down barriers between the two
educational systems and integrat[e] students with disabilities more fully into the general
education classroom." JIM YSSELDYKE & BOB ALGOZZINE, PUBLIC POLICY, SCHOOL REFORM,
AND SPECIAL EDUCATION 21 (2006). Professors Ysseldyke and Algozzine suggest that the
early debate about REI was amongst special educators and parents. The former were
concerned about job loss or whether they possessed the necessary consultation skills to share
responsibility for disabled students with regular teachers. Parents worried whether their
children would be educated appropriately in an inclusive setting. Id.
51. On the well meaning, but unintended usage of "inclusion," see Rosenbaum, When
It's Not Apparent, supra note 14, at 182 n.74 (.'[I]ncluded' simply becomes a euphemism
for 'retarded' or 'special ed.' .... If one is truly 'included,' the word itself should fade away
as a modifier."). See also Rosenbaum, Representing David,supra note 14, at 178 (describing
how, after being enrolled in regular classrooms since kindergarten with large doses of
genuine inclusiveness, David hit a brick wall in high school when it came to programmatic
and social integration).
52. But see Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, art. 24, G.A. Res.
61/106, 76th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/106 (Dec. 13, 2006), available at
http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/enable/rights/convtexte.htm ("States Parties shall ensure an
inclusive education system at all levels and life long learning [and] that ... [p]ersons with
disabilities can access an inclusive, quality and free primary education and secondary
education on an equal basis with others in the communities in which they live .... ")
(emphasis added). The treaty entered into force on May 3, 2008. The United States has
neither signed nor ratified the Convention. For a discussion of the need for a "holistic"
disability rights agenda that adopts social, cultural, and economic rights-such as the right to
inclusive education-along with the "first generation" disability civil and political rights, see
generally Stein & Stein, supra note 27.
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adequate advance training or support for teachers-and pray that it works. Or,
pray that it does not work so that when the parents come back to the IEP table,
they will be too disillusioned or dispirited to insist on placin their child in a
5
more integrated, yet pedagogically challenging, environment.
Up until now, there has not been much overt backlash to placing children
with disabilities in regular classrooms, in part because it would be viewed as
anti-egalitarian and mean-spirited. Nonetheless, there has been whispering and
54
grumbling by parents in some quarters, which is likely to grow louder.
We can choose to be indignant or dismissive about this sub rosa sentiment,
or we can try to address the concerns and educate fellow parents. Both
strategically and pragmatically, it is worth seeking allies within the school and
forging relationships with parents of other students who feel they are not being
55
well served in the system.

VI. A NEW PARADIGM
While, as Professor Hensel suggests, we need not further limit who is
eligible for the special education label, 56 it is not sufficient to merely maintain
the current eligibility definition and decrease the level of services for these
students. Rather, we should peel off the labels so that we do not have
competition for resources and services between the youth who are at risk and
those who meet the definition of disabled-whether the gap is between pupils
with IEPs and those with section 504 plans or between "regular ed" and
"special ed" youngsters. We must look at each child individually. 57 The
research 58 and the current public policy 59 appear to support this approach.
53. One writer acknowledges the popular and succinct concept of inclusion that
"[s]pecial ed should be a service, not a place," Duff, supra note 36, at 143 as well as the
challenges of having a student in general education who "can't keep up with the rest of the
class." Id. at 144.
54. Last year, one California school district offered evidence in a due process
proceeding consisting of letters written to a school principal complaining about a special
education pupil's disruption of the class. One parent wrote: "Our children remained in class
with this student the entire fourth grade. She continues to yell out in class, other students still
get headaches, and are still distracted and disrupted. For most of us this has not been the first
year our children have been forced to try to make the best with this bad situation. We want it
to be the last year." San Ramon Valley Unified Sch. Dist. v. [Student], Off. of Admin.
Hearings, No. N2007020638 (letter on file with author).
55. See, e.g., Patricia A. Massey & Stephen A. Rosenbaum, Disability Matters:
Toward a Law School Clinical Model for Serving Youth with Special Education Needs, 11
CLINICAL L. REV. 271, 311-15 nn.207-17 (2005) (discussing models for group advocacy,
coalition-building and community organizing in a special education context).
56. See Hensel, supra note 6.
57. See Rosenbaum, Aligning or Maligning?, supra note 2, at 26-28 (noting NCLB
mandate to boost achievement levels of all students through tailored instruction, regardless
of classification); Weber, Reflections, supra note 5, at 22-23 (noting that early intervening
services to students needing additional academic or behavioral support may be less
stigmatizing); see also G. Reid Lyon et al., Rethinking Learning Disabilities,in RETHINKING
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There is no reason why the entitlement to a free appropriate public
education should be limited to students in need of specialized instruction. For
all its ambiguity, the concept of FAPE is at least more recognized and studied
as a national educational benchmark than anything applied to students not
labeled "disabled." Doesn't every child deserve an individualized learning plan
that charts a course for obtaining an appropriate education and measuring her
progress? 60 Shouldn't that plan be subjected to the same parental participation
and vigilance that are key to the success of every special needs student?
Congress has affirmed this6 1 and our intuition tells us that as well. 62 The
SPECIAL EDUCATION FOR A NEW CENTURY, supra note 6, at 259 (describing how early
identification and prevention programs for at-risk children can reduce number of students
who later require intensive, long-term special education programs).
58. Researchers, for example, have suggested that there is an overlap in needs between
those labeled "disabled" and those deemed "at risk." It is difficult to distinguish pupils with
high-incidence learning disabilities from those who are "low achieving" or "educationally
disadvantaged." Margaret J. McLaughlin & Kelly Henderson, Defining U.S. Special
Education into the Twenty-First Century, in SPECIAL EDUCATION IN THE 21ST CENTURY 43,
58 (Margret A. Winzer & Kas Mazurek eds., 2000). In one study of minority children,
researchers observed that students who are failing, but not eligible for special education,
"fall between the cracks." HARRY & KLINGNER, supra note 36, at 14.
59. See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. §1400(c)(5)(F) (2008) (noting congressional finding that "early
intervening" services, such as scientifically based early reading programs and positive
behavioral interventions can "reduce the need to label children as disabled"). One
commentator suggests even further IDEA amendments to address early on the needs of lowperforming students-with explicit consideration of their socio-economic status, English
language proficiency, and family support-to prevent their eventual need for special
education services. Carothers, supra note 36, at 570-84.
60. Rosenbaum, When It's Not Apparent, supra note 14, at 161 n.12 (observing that
universal IEP "is a mandate waiting to happen"). As a step in that direction, a California
legislator introduced a bill in 2001 to require parents, teachers and "low achieving" students
to jointly develop a "personal learning agreement." The bill, Assemb. B. 1238, 2001-02 Reg.
Sess. (Cal. 2001), died in committee. See Complete Bill History, A.B. 1238,
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/Ol-02/bill/asm/ab_1201-1250/ab-1238_bill_20020207_
history.html (last visited March 16, 2008). In Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359, 366 n.30 (N.J.
1990) (Abbott II), the New Jersey Supreme Court acknowledged that "recent scholarly
discussion has focused heavily on the need for individualized instruction tailored to
" (emphasis
children's different needs and development patterns, experimental learning ..
added, citations omitted). Although the Court's chief concern was with financial inequity
between school districts and the marginalization of minority students from a school system
perceived as .'white' and alien," its acknowledgement is no less important. Abbott 11, 575
A.2d at 366 n.30. See also KELMAN & LESTER, supra note 8 at 157; Hensel, supra note 6, at
1197 n.268 (citing scholarly support for individualized plans for demonstrated low
achievers).
61. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(5)(A)-(B) (2008) (noting that research and experience
demonstrate effectiveness of having high expectations for youngsters and in strengthening
parental participation); see also GEORGE R. TAYLOR, PARENTING SKILLS AND
COLLABORATIVE SERVICES FOR STUDENTS WITH DISABILITIES 88 (2004) (noting importance
of involving parents in curriculum development and construction).
62. See Rosenbaum, Aligning or Maligning?, supra note 2, at 31-33 (describing
importance of parental role in school governance and quality control through official and
outside channels). Parental governance is not unique to special education. It was envisioned
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parental monitoring cannot be limited only to those who have the
sophistication, affluence, and educational background. Professor Hensel put it
bluntly: "In the absence of due process guarantees, a school district may ignore
the parents of children with disabilities with impunity because they have no
enforceable rights to the contrary." 63 It is a role that also belongs to parents of
poorer, limited English, and other marginalized youth, not yet identified as
eligible for special education. 64 The remedy, as Professor Terry Jean
Seligmann recognized before the federal statute was last amended-and which
I advocate here-is that "the principles that shape the IDEA should be
preserved and expanded. A focus on the individual child's needs, parental
involvement, enforceable rights, and a range of services should be part of every
' 65
school child's life, not only those designated as 'special.'
To the extent that there has been a campaign to define a universal standard
for all students, it is uneven. For example, the adequacy-of-funding movement
has spawned litigation in some states that attempt to define a "thorough" or
"adequate" education. 66 Although much of the jurisprudence addresses per

in NCLB in the form of local councils and consultation on school improvement plans. 20
U.S.C. § 6316(b)(5) (2000); 34 C.F.R. § 200.41(a)(2) (2003). Yet most of the parental
participation provisions have not been implemented. Amanda Broun et al., Public
Engagement in School Reform: Building PublicResponsibilityfor Public Education,4 STAN.
J. C.R. & C.L. 217 (2008).
63. Hensel, supra note 6, at 1189.
64. Hensel, supra note 6, at 1150 n.17; see also TAYLOR, supra note 61, at 103 (noting
that minority group parents in particular find school to be "an intimidating place"); Massey
& Rosenbaum, supra note 55, at 281-83 (noting barriers to IDEA enforcement by parents
hampered by socio-economic class, educational background, English language proficiency,
and/or lack of legal services); Stephen A. Rosenbaum, The Juris Doctor is In: Making Room
at Law School for Paraprofessional Partners, 75 TENN. L. REv. 315, 323-29 (2008)
(observing that lay advocates can effectively assist parents in this role). For instance, the
Georgia Advocacy Office, a part of the federal protection and advocacy system, conducts a
Parent Leadership Support Project. This four-month lay advocacy program in grassroots
parent leadership, trains parents and other "concerned citizens" to "master the information
and skills necessary to secure educational opportunities" for children with disabilities.
Georgia Advocacy Office, http://thegao.org/training.htm (last visited March 28, 2008). The
training is not limited to parents and family members of disabled pupils, but reaches out to a
broad segment of the lay community, who in turn embrace and advocate for these youngsters
in ways that go beyond intoning the legal intricacies of the IDEA. Audio CD: Leslie Lipson,
Project Manager, Conference on Special Education Advocacy, held by Council of Parent
Attorneys and Advocates (COPAA) (Mar. 8, 2008) (on file with author).
65. Seligmann, supra note 6, at 761; see also Rosenbaum, Aligning or Maligning?
supra note 2, at 21-22 (noting congressional approval for funding intervention services for
children who "narrowly miss an eligibility label").
66. Professor Paul Tractenberg dissects the constitutional phrase "thorough and
efficient education" as used in New Jersey and several other states. Paul L. Tractenberg,
Beyond EducationalAdequacy: Looking Backward and ForwardThrough the Lens of New
Jersey, 4 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 411 (2008). In the longstanding Abbott school finance
litigation, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that the "constitutional requirement of a
thorough and efficient education encompasses more than instruction in the basic
communications and computational skills, but also requires that students be given at least a
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pupil funding equity at a district or aggregate level, the courts have eked out
language that could be used to burnish the IDEA's "appropriate" standard,6 7
ranging from "a chance to excel"'68 to "equip[ping] a child for his role as a
citizen and as a competitor in the labor market"' 69 to "prepar[ing] [students] for
useful and happy occupations, recreation and citizenship ....
Obviously,
the standards-based reform movement culminating in the NCLB Act is also an
attempt to define academic content standards, set state-by-state and measured
through periodic testing, but with 7 no
mandate for individualized planning,
1
accountability or dispute resolution.
One of the objectives of No Child Left Behind-the Act and the slogan-is
that schools must address the needs of all children. This means children with
disabilities, as well as English language learners, poor youngsters, immigrants,
homeless and foster care youth, and members of ethnic, racial, or sexual
minorities. There is a whole host of children who are marginalized
or otherwise
72
at risk of failure and who are not classified as disabled students.
Yet, to date, it is hard to conclude that NCLB has been little more than a
slogan. With regard to disabled students, faculty and staff respondents to one
modicum of variety and a chance to excel." Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359, 365-66 (N.J.
1990) (Abbott I).
67. As Tractenberg notes, the court's concept of "thorough and efficient" education is
an evolving one. Tractenberg, supra note 66.
68. Abbott II, 575 A.2d at 365-66.
69. Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273, 295 (N.J. 1973) (citing Landis v. Ashworth, 31
A. 1017 (N.J. 1895)). The emphasis on vocational skills and preparation for adult living
dovetails very nicely with the component of postsecondary "transition" planning and
services under the IDEA. See 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(1) (stating that the ultimate goal of the
Act is to provide "equality of opportunity, full participation, independent living, and
economic self-sufficiency"); see also J.L. v. Mercer Island Sch. Dist., No. C06-494P, 2006
WL 3628033, at *4 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 8, 2006) ("The IDEA is not simply about 'access;' it
is focused on 'transition services, . . . an outcome-oriented process, which promotes
movement from school to post-school activities . . . taking into account the student's
preferences and interests."' (citing amended statute and regulations with emphasis added)).
Education for "learning and life and citizenship" is the phrase used by the plaintiffs' counsel
in the PARC case when he summed up the objective of IDEA in the nearly four decades
following the landmark district court litigation. Thomas Gilhool, Keynote Address at the
Tenth Anniversary Conference, Council on Parent Attorneys & Advocates (COPAA),
Anaheim, Calif (Mar. 7, 2008) (on file with author).
70. Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859, 877 (W.Va. 1979). West Virginia's Supreme
Court was one of the first state courts to address the requisite qualitative level of educational
services under a state constitution, viz. one that "develops, as best the state of education
expertise allows, the minds, bodies and social morality of its charges to prepare them for
useful and happy occupations, recreation and citizenship, and does so economically." Id.
71. In expressing concern that disabled students, although accommodated, may remain
unidentified in the general education classroom, Professor Hensel notes that NCLB has no
requirement "to consult with parents in devising adequate educational plans and bestows no
enforceable individual rights when disagreements arise." Hensel, supra note 6, at 1176-77. It
is precisely these latter features that could be appended to students sitting outside the special
education arena.
72. See Rosenbaum, Aligning or Maligning?, supranote 2, at 21.
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recent survey believed that the Act's requirements would "inflict harm" on
students with disabilities. 73 The survey's author writes: "Indeed with its onesize-fits-all approach to school reform, NCLB fails to recognize that equity in
education with equal opportunities for students to reach fullest potential must
not be confused with equality or sameness of result, or even identical
experience." 74 The criticism of NCLB because of its impact on disabled
students is not much different from overall criticism of the Act: meaningful
curriculum has been "elbowed out to make room for test-oriented
' 75
instruction."
I can visualize a placard around my neck emblazoned with the word
"heretic." I am not so naive as to deny the fear from the special needs advocacy
community that if we drop protective status for youths with disability, and take
away the disability label, or the separate assessment process, we will dilute
services and spread resources too thinly. 76 Professor Hensel herself warns that
a "collapse [in] any meaningful distinction between children with impairments
and low performers generally . . . threatens the ability of children with
cognitive impairments to secure the due process and individualized education
promised by IDEA eligibility." 77 Nor do I wish to fall into the trap laid by
those who protest that the child in special education is educated at the expense
78
of general education pupils.
VII. IT'S THE TEACHING

While opening the services door wider to other students, I would retain
the multiple assessments, planning process, determination of goals and

objectives, and appropriate program-whatever appropriate means 79 -for
73. Sally Harvey-Koelpin, The Impact of Reform on Students With Disabilities, in
WHO BENEFITS FROM SPECIAL EDUCATION?, supra note 27, at 141 (study of school placed on

school improvement plan).
74. Id. at 141-42 (citation omitted).
75. Id. at 142 (citation omitted); see also Broun, supra note 62, (noting that despite
agreement with NCLB goals, parental skepticism of, and resistance to, Act's implementation
remains high).
76. Professor Mark Weber argues, for example, that when the federal special education
allocations have "too few eligibility strings attached, general education absorbs it and the
federal goal of helping children with disabilities is frustrated." Weber, supra note 5, at 22.
77. Hensel, supra note 6, at 1167. Hensel does acknowledge, however, that a broader
classification scheme could help reduce stigma. Id. at 1194. Her point is laudable insofar as
it makes a commitment to all struggling students, wherever they are on the learning
spectrum.
78. Id. at 1149 n.12; see also supra note 38.
79. Since the IDEA was amended in 1997 and again in 2004, some judges and
commentators have suggested that the low bar established in Board of Education v. Rowley,
458 U.S. 176 (1982), has been raised. See, e.g., Eckrem & McArthur, supra note 47, at 200213 (noting that 1997 amendments moved focus of statute-and Rowley Court-from access
to schools to results); Andrea Valentino, Note, The Individuals With Disabilities Education
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students with disabilities. We must continue to prepare and mentor teachers
who are adept at individuated instruction, whether their students are deemed
gifted or talented, at-risk or special needs. 80 It takes a gifted and talented
teacher to get it right.
The true success stories in special education are not about voluminous and
well-crafted Cadillac educational plans, 8 1 but about the interventions and
support provided by qualified, creative, and compassionate teachers, other
professionals, and paraprofessionals-who are often overworked and
underpaid. "Qualified" means more than saying the teacher must meet the
"highly qualified" certification and licensure standards required under the 2004
IDEA reauthorization and NCLB. 82 When there is collaboration between

Improvement Act: Changing What Constitutes An "Appropriate" Education, 20 J.L. &
HEALTH 139, 155-66 (2006/2007) (noting that by modifying certain IEP requirements and
instituting "highly qualified" educator and peer-reviewed research concepts, 2004
amendments call for shift from procedural compliance to a "substantive standard"). In JL. v.
Mercer Island School Dist., No. C06-494P (W.D. Wash. Dec. 8, 2006) the court held
explicitly that the standards for FAPE set forth by Rowley were no longer relevant because
of significant changes in the IDEA amendments and "that any citation to pre- 1997 case law
on special education is suspect." Id. at *4. Arguably, there is now a higher standard: whether
a program "guide[s] the student toward post-education independence and self-sufficiency."
Id. at *8. The case is currently on appeal. See also Philip T.K. Daniel & Jill Meinhardt,
Valuing the Education of Students with Disabilities: Has Government Legislation Caused a
Reinterpretation of Free Appropriate Public Education?, 222 EDUC. L. REP. 515, 529-35
(2007) (arguing that the Rowley FAPE standard is outdated in light of the NCLB reform
movement's emphasis on state educational content standards and proficiency testing).
80. Even while the 2004 amendments were being debated, educators-motivated in
part by concern for over-identification of minority children as special education studentscalled "for a transformation of all classrooms into places where individualized teaching is
the norm . . . [and] the merger of special and regular education through inclusion of all
children within the regular classroom as the way to accomplish this." Seligmann, supra note
6, at 766 & nn.50-5 1.
81. In keeping with the vehicle motif for special ed students, one appellate court
declared in an oft-quoted passage that under IDEA "the Board [of Education] is not required
to provide a Cadillac" to a disabled pupil, but the "educational equivalent of a serviceable
Chevrolet." Doe v. Bd. of Educ. of Tullahoma City Sch., 9 F.3d 455, 459-60 (6th Cir. 1993).
82. 34 C.F.R. §§ 200.56, 300.18 (2007). This is an intangible characteristic, not subject
to testing or in-service training. Even the laudable proposal to require effective highly
qualified teachers in an amended NCLB is unlikely to produce the necessary corps of
teaching staff. See, e.g., THE ASPEN INST. COMM. ON No CHILD LEFT BEHIND, TEACHER AND
PRINCIPAL RECOMMENDATIONS: EFFECTIVE TEACHERS FOR ALL STUDENTS, EFFECTIVE
PRINCIPALS FOR ALL COMMUNITIES (2007), available at http://www.aspeninstitute.org/

site/c.huLWJeMRKpH/b.938015 [hereinafter Aspen Institute Commission Report]. The
Commission report recommends that a Highly Qualified Effective Teacher (HQET)
demonstration-based standard replace the current HQT credential mandate under NCLB,
whereby teachers would be required to produce "learning gains as measured by growth
models," to receive positive peer reviews from teachers or their principal and would be
guaranteed "high-quality" professional development. Id. at 185. More recently, veteran
attorney Gilhool called on advocates to engage in a direct action to "support and nourish"
special education teachers to demand that they learn to be "effective" teachers to put to use
what are known to be effective interventions and strategies. Gilhool, supra note 69.
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educators and parents, this stands up mightily against the statute books, the best
practices manuals, and the hyper-technical compliance logs.
The reality is that most teachers enrolled in teacher training programs are
offered an infinitesimal amount of course work related to special education
methodology. This is how a prominent educator and his associate describe the
status quo:
Most teacher training programs today continue to encourage general
education teachers to expect special education teachers to assume
primary responsibility for students with IEPs. Special education
departments at colleges and universities reinforce this notion by
training special education teachers in self-contained classrooms and by
having little overlap with general education
departments, such as
83
departments of curriculum and instruction.
Every prospective teacher-and administrator--entering the university
ought to have courses in special education. Why do teachers choose at the
outset of their credential program between a general educational curriculum
and a special education emphasis? 84 Teachers ought to be qualified to teach in
a number of different environments. 85 Although Hensel concedes the wisdom
of "widespread individualization of instruction," she, among other scholars, is
dubious that this can be accomplished without some kind of labeling process
and adequate funding. 86 While it is true that there is a dearth of "unified"
programs for teacher and school administrator training and preparation, there
are indeed supporters and innovators. 87

83. Wayne Sailor & Blair Roger, Rethinking Inclusion: Schoolwide Applications in PHI
506 (March 2005) (citing CLAUDE GOLDENBERG, SUCCESSFUL SCHOOL
CHANGE 138-62 (2004)).
84. On the subject of collaboration between general and special educators, see, for
example, Christine C. Givner & Diane Haager, Strategies for Effective Collaboration, in
INCLUSIVE AND HETEROGENEOUS SCHOOLING 41-57 (Mary A. Falvey ed., 1995); Diane
Browder et al., Aligning Instruction With Academic Content Standards: Findingthe Link, 31
RES. & PRAC. FOR PERSONS WITH SEVERE DISABILITIES 309, 312-13 (2006).
85. Certainly, law and other professional school faculty embrace the notion that there is
a core curriculum to which all students should be exposed, with time to specialize through
practice, and postgraduate professional development and in-service training.
86. Hensel, supra note 6, at 1197 & nn.267-68. While Hensel and some of the experts
she cites are dismissive of this "optimistic and idealistic" approach, their pessimism appears
to stem from a concern that teachers will be ill-prepared. Id.
87. See, e.g., Marleen C. Pugach, Unifying the Preparationof Prospective Teachers, in
CONTROVERSIAL ISSUES CONFRONTING SPECIAL EDUCATION 239, 241 (William Steinback &
Susan Steinback eds., 2d ed. 1996) ("Structuring schools to meet individual needs is
essentially the same challenge for special and general education."); see also JAMES J.
GALLAGHER, DRIVING CHANGE IN SPECIAL EDUCATION 91 (2006) (describing "blended"
programs in early childhood and special education early childhood preparation, programs for
general educators and in-service); WEISHAAR et al. supra note 32, at 38 (noting that with
"dual system" of training teachers and administrators, there is little chance for "true
educational reform"). For a more sobering-and international-perspective, see Julie Allan,
Failing to Make Progress? The Aporias of Responsible Inclusion, in WHO BENEFITS FROM
SPECIAL EDUCATION?, supra note 27, at 27.
DELTA KAPPAN

Oct. 2008]

FULL SP[]EDAHEAD

Part of the change comes from the way we perceive inclusion or "inclusive
education." If we focus only on the student, the school environment and culture
will never change. Some scholars and activists promote the notion of "inclusive
schools" 88 which rely on a "complex and oftentimes difficult concept" of
school governance. Its aim is to assist educators to work effectively with all
students "without the complicated system of singling out and/or labeling certain
children . . . and isolating them to provide special education services." 89 To
build these schools will require more than legislating the presence of a Highly
Effective Principal (HEP), or proscribing
any other all-purpose snake oil to be
90
rubbed all over America's schools.

VIII. THE Bus STOPS HERE
To make IDEA truly effective, we needn't change the definition of who is
able to "get on the bus." We simply must get the pupils off the short bus and on
board a bigger one. Professor Hensel writes that it is not enough for a regular
ed student to board the short bus without hesitation. 9 1 I would prefer to
dispense with that short bus altogether. In the end, the youngsters with
disabilities, those not proficient in English, the homeless, migrant and poor
kids, the queer, 92 and young people caught up in the juvenile justice system

88. See, e.g., Jean B. Crockett, Special Education's Role in Preparing Responsive
Leadersfor Inclusive Schools, 23 REMEDIAL & SPECIAL EDUC. 157 (May/June 2002) (stating
the importance of preparing administrators to become informed leaders committed to
inclusive educational environments).
89. WEISHAAR ET AL., supra note 32, at 17-18.
90. See ASPEN INSTITUTE COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 82 at 197 (recommending a
HEP mandate to complement the call for a Highly Qualified Effective Teacher (HQET)). It
is telling that neither HEP nor HQET addresses the need for educators to strive for inclusive
schools, to account for learning differences amongst students, or embrace any of the
principles that would unify the segregated special and general education approaches to
learning. Instead, we are asked to endorse legislation introducing two new acronyms founded
on well-meaning, but vague, formulaic criteria. Schools need more acronyms like they need
more (re)forms. See Duff, supra note 36, at 135 (when informed by an interviewer of
upcoming IDEA reforms, one school secretary responded: "Oh great ... more forms.").
91. "The fight will ... be won ... when society fails to notice the length of the bus at
all." Hensel, supra note 6, at 1202. I share this view of the fight, but disagree with Hensel
that we win by "[c]reating clear eligibility standards [to] assist in insulating these important
decisions from the political and ideological insulation." Professor Weishaar and her
colleagues capture my perspective when they state unequivocally: "If change is to be
meaningful, it will be necessary to fade the lines between the disabled and the nondisabled in
the nation's classrooms." WEISHAAR ET AL., supra note 32, at 38.
92. Why is it acceptable to say queer-and crip, quad,gimp and even cripple-but not
spaz, idiot or retard? "The 'R' Word Campaign," a grassroots effort initiated in 2007 to
inform the public of the prejudicial and discriminatory use of the words "retard" or
"retarded," tries to answer that question. See Stop and Think ... The "R" Word Campaign,
http://www.therword.org (last visited Feb. 17, 2008). "Language matters-and they're
absolutely hurtful," said one state senator referring to words that were the target of
legislation in California last year to rid the state codes of the outdated and insulting terms for
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will all join their "typically developing peers." 93 Together, they will ride the
bus down the great American highway-be it El Camino Real 94, Route 66, the
Cumberland Gap 95 -- or any other route our children travel to the school that
offers them the necessary services and supports on their educational journey. 96

persons with mental disabilities: idiot, imbecile and lunatic. Jim Sanders, No Idiots, In
State's View, Under Bill, SACRAMENTO BEE, May 7, 2007, at Al; see also H.R. 760, 2008
Sess., at 1 (Va. 2008); S.J. Res. 620, 2008 Sess., at 1 (Va. 2008) (replacing "mentally
retarded" with "intellectually disabled" throughout the Code of Virginia). On the politics of
naming, see Stephen A. Rosenbaum, Hammerin' Hank: The Right to Be Raunchy or FM
Freak Show?, 23 DISABILITY STUDIES QTRLY, nn.51-57 (2003), available at
http://www.brandeis.edu/lemberg/SGHL/DSQ.html (discussing the reclaiming of outmoded
identity terms and epithets).
93. See, e.g., M.L. v. Federal Way Sch. Dist., 394 F.3d 634, 637, n.4 (9th Cir. 2005)
(defining "regular" classroom as consisting of both "typically developing" and disabled
pupils); J.L. v. Mercer Island School Dist., No. C06-494P, 2006 WL 3628033, at *2 (W.D.
Wash. Dec. 8, 2006) (explaining "mainstreaming" as practice of educating disabled students
alongside their "typically-developing peers").
94. Linda D. Kilb, The State of the ADA and California Law, Speech at the Hastings
College of the Law National Disability Law Symposium (Feb. 3, 2007), available at
http://www.dredf.org/publications/speeches.shtml
(last
visited
July
2,
2008) (allusion to California's historic disability rights journey during Spanish colonial
times on El Camino Real, the Royal Road, of which a small segment borders Stanford
University campus).
95. Route 66, traversing the nation's heartland from Illinois to California, is also
known as "The Mother Road." The Mother Road: Historic Route 66,
http://www.historic66.com (last visited Dec. 18, 2007). The Cumberland Gap had been in
use for foot traffic by Native Americans before Europeans colonized America. In 1775,
Daniel Boone blazed a trail that became a primary route used by settlers moving into
Kentucky and Tennessee, and was later referred to as the "Wilderness Road." Old US 25E:
Crossing the Cumberland Gap, http://www.us-highways.com/cgap00.htm (last visited Dec.
18, 2007).
96. This may ultimately be the same "less traveled" road that Professor Tractenberg
urges us to take, invoking the words of Poet Robert Frost. Tractenberg, supra note 66, at 425
(citation omitted).

